generated from atu/saiop-infrastructure
78 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
78 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: saiop-mikrotik-mcp
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description: "MikroTik (RouterOS) read-only MCP access for rt-alpha — TLS debugging notes and the read-only verification method."
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version: 1.0.0
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author: Claude Code (SAIOP ops session)
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license: MIT
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platforms: [linux]
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prerequisites:
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env_vars: [MIKROTIK_PASSWORD]
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commands: [uv]
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metadata:
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hermes:
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tags: [SAIOP, MCP, MikroTik, RouterOS, network, security]
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---
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# MikroTik (rt-alpha) read-only MCP access
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## When to use
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Querying the ATU network's MikroTik router (`rt-alpha`,
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`169.239.248.166`) for read-only diagnostics (interfaces, routes, DHCP
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leases, firewall rules) via Hermes.
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## What's wired up
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A custom single-tool MCP server (`/opt/ai-stack/hermes/scripts/mikrotik_mcp.py`,
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run via `uv run --with mcp --with librouteros`) connects via the RouterOS
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API over TLS (port 8729) as a dedicated `claudeuser` account.
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**Two independent layers, same pattern as postgres-mcp/proxmox-mcp:**
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1. The `claudeuser` RouterOS account itself is read-only — **independently
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verified**, not assumed: a real write attempt (`/interface/set` to
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change a comment) returned `TrapError: not enough permissions (9)`
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directly from the device's permission system.
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2. The MCP tool also only accepts paths ending in `/print`, `/getall`, or
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`/export` (rejects anything else before even attempting the call) —
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defense-in-depth on top of #1, not the primary boundary.
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## TLS gotchas hit getting here (useful if this recurs for other network gear)
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- Initial connection attempts failed with a TLS handshake failure. Root
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cause: RouterOS's `api-ssl` service had **no certificate assigned**, so
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it fell back to **anonymous Diffie-Hellman ciphers** (`ADH-AES256-SHA256`)
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— meaning no server authentication at all. Confirmed via raw
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`openssl s_client -cipher "ALL:@SECLEVEL=0" -tls1_2`, which negotiated
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successfully where every normal client library failed (modern TLS
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stacks don't enable anonymous ciphers the same permissive way the CLI
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does, even with matching settings — spent real effort confirming this
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was the device's config, not a bug in our approach, before escalating
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to ask for a router-side fix).
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- **The actual fix was on the device, not the client**: assigning a real
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certificate to the `api-ssl` service
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(`/certificate add` + `/certificate sign` + `/ip service set api-ssl
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certificate=...`). Once that landed, standard TLS negotiated cleanly —
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no special cipher/version pinning needed in the client at all.
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- Even with a real cert, it had its own separate issues (expired,
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CN mismatch vs. the hostname used to connect) — handled with
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`verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE` in the client, since we already have
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independent assurance of which device we're talking to (the ~1ms ping
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latency confirms it's on a directly-attached local segment, not
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reachable for interception the way a public-internet path would be).
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Worth a routine cert renewal on the network side regardless.
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- `librouteros`'s `Api.__call__` takes the RouterOS path **positionally**,
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not as a `cmd=` keyword (`api("/interface/print")`, not
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`api(cmd="/interface/print")`) — easy mistake, produces a confusing
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`TypeError: missing 1 required positional argument`.
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## Why a custom server instead of `mcp-server-mikrotik`
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That package exists and is actively maintained, but it's the wrong shape
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for this need: it connects via **SSH and an interactive shell**, uses
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RouterOS's own "Safe Mode" (a revert-on-disconnect safety net for *live
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config changes*, not a read-only restriction), and exposes broad
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read-write scope across firewall/DHCP/DNS/NAT/backup management. Writing
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~70 lines against the already-verified API connection was less work and
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matches the actual need (read-only diagnostics) far more precisely — same
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reasoning as the `proxmox-mcp` custom server earlier in this project.
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